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All mankind is now about to face a global age. This does not simply mean 
that whole world is now totally covered and integrated by the rapidly ad­
vancing universality of technology, such as jet airplanes, various means of 
instant communication and so forth. It also means the people of the world, 
as individuals and as nations, politically, and economically, act, react and 
interact just as one group. Almost no part of the globe is free from being 
involved in the world-wide waves of unity, tension, opposition and conflict. 
However, I think, what is most significant and decisive for the destiny of 
mankind in this regard is the encounter of the world religions which is, in 
a scale and depth as never experienced before, taking place underneath or 
entangled with the complex process of the political, economic and social 
integration of the world. How openly and profoundly, under the present 
intensive situation, the encounter or dialogue between the world religions 
will be carried out in the search for a new spiritual horizon, is vital to 
the future of mankind. The global age will produce dissension as well as 
unity, and will elevate as well as destroy mankind. As a real basis of the 
global age a new spiritual horizon is needed which can open up the inner­
most depth of human religiosity and on which all nations can display their 
spiritual and cultural creativity without being dehumanized and deindivid­
ualized by the world’s sociological complexity or by technological conf­
ormity.
At this critical point in history, the appearance of Paul Tillich’s book, 
Christianity and the Encounter of the World. Religions, is most welcome 
and highly significant, for the book can be taken as the result of a frontal 
inquiry into the above-mentioned problem by one of the most outstanding 
Christian theologians and philosophers of religion today. In this book the 
inquiry into the problem has been made from the Christian point of view, 
but with the discerning insight that “the main characteristic of the present 
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encounter of the world religions is their encounter with the quasi-religions 
of our time.” (p. 5) In this context the author presents penetrating observa­
tions, a dynamic point of view, and a new insight for the task of religion. 
Thus he expects, as expressed in the preface of the book, “critical thought 
not only with respect to the relation of Christianity to the world religions 
but also with respect to its own nature. ” The following is intended not 
simply as a review of his work but rather as a response to his hope by a 
Buddhist who, being critical as well as sympathetic with his approach, has 
the same concern as the author about this subject and who likewise has the 
intention especially to promote a dialogue between Christianity and Bud­
dhism from the side of Buddhism.
Tillich’s position and his characterization of the present religious situation.
In the first chapter “A View of the Present Situation : Religions, Quasi­
Religions, and their Encounter,” the author first defines his own position in 
dealing with the present religious situation as an “observing participant,” 
a position fusing the standpoint of an outside observer and of an inside par­
ticipant. He then, in the light of his now well known definition of religion, 
that is, “the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern,” describes the 
main characteristic of the present encounter of the world religions as “their 
encounter with the quasi-religions of our time.” His position as an “observ­
ing participant” and bis characterization of the present encounter of the 
world religions are, I think, closely connected with each other in his inner 
thinking.
It is a necessary and invaluable insight to find the main characteristic 
of the present encounter of the world religions not merely in the nature of 
their mutual encounter but in their encounter with the quasi-religions of 
today. Tillich rightly says, “Even the mutual relations of the religions 
proper are decisively influenced by the encounter of each of them with 
secularism and one or more of the quasi-religions which are based upon 
secularism.” I too have pointed out in my paper which appeared in Japanese 
Religions that the problem of the encounter of the world religions should 
be taken in the context of the issue between religion and irreligion or anti­
religion1. With Tillich I believe that such a broad perspective covering 
secularism or the so-called irreligious forces is now absolutely necessary to 
properly understand the present-day encounter of the world religions. 
What is, however, different between Tillich and myself in this regard is 
1 See Japanese Religions, “Buddhism and Christianity as a Problem of To­
day.” Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 13-15.
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that whereas Tillich emphasizes the quasi-religions I emphasize the anti- 
religious forces as the other part of that encounter of the world religions 
apart from which their mutual relations can not properly and adequately 
be understood. My so-called antireligious forces are not always other than 
Tillich’s so-called quasi-religions. In so far as we follow Tillich’s definition 
of religion, some anti-religious forces, because of their religious elements, 
should be likewise regarded as quasi-religions. My point is, however, 
that some forms of secularism as an unneglectable factor in a study of the 
encounter between religions proper should be taken in terms of their anti- 
religious character rather than in terms of their quasi-religious nature. By 
the term “anti-religious,” I particularly mean any form of quasi-religion 
which, besides its common character of elevating a preliminary concern to 
ultimacy, negates, in principle, religion proper. The conspicuous examples 
of quasi-religions today are, in Tillich’s view, nationalism (and its Fascist 
radicalization), socialism (and its Communist radicalization) and liberal 
humanism. In them nation, social order and humanity, though all finite and 
transitory, are often, especially in their radical forms, elevated to an 
ultimate concern. “Quasi,” according to Tillich, indicates a genuine simi­
larity, not intended, but based on points of identity, while “pseudo” indica­
tes an intended but deceptive similarity, (p. 5) In giving such a panorama 
of the present religious situation, Tillich seems to take the encounter of 
the world religions with the quasi-religions today as an historic- or cultural- 
religious event and not necessarily as an existential encounter at the risk of 
his own faith.
This may be a natural consequence of his position as an “ observing 
participant.” I believe, however, that in the present religious situation, if 
any religious person takes the matter existentially enough, he cannot remain 
an observing participant, but should be or can no t help being a self-staking 
participant, because the most acute and serious character of the encounter 
of the world religions is to be found in their encounter with the anti- 
religious forces of our time rather than with the quasi-religions of today. 
A follower of religion today is now exposed to the attack of the anti- 
religious forces which, unlike the quasi-religions, consciously deny the 
raison d’etre of religion from some philosophical base. Scientism, Marxism, 
and Nihilism in Nietzsche’s sense may be mentioned as conspicuous 
examples. In the book now under review, scientism as the technological 
invasion of the traditional cultures and religions, and Marxism in the 
form of Communism are taken into account. However, in so far as they are 
considered as quasi-religions with secularism as their base, their religion­
negating aspect (negating religion with a philosophical principle) is over­
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looked. Again, in this book there can be found no reference to nihilism 
which, in my view, is the most radical form of a religion-negating stand­
point, the overcoming of which is the sine qua non for the establishment of 
the raison d’etre of religion today. It is of course important and significant 
to characterize the present encounter of the world religions as their en­
counter with the quasi-religions of our time, taking Fascism, Communism 
and liberal humanism as the conspicuous examples. We should, however, 
notice that some forms of secularism have taken on the character of anti­
religions rather than quasi-religions. Scientism and Marxism are, to my 
mind, examples of anti-religions, while liberal humanism, though rightly 
regarded as a quasi-religion, can not necessarily be considered an anti- 
religious force. When we take such forms of secularism as scientism, Mar­
xism and so forth as quai-religions, we come to take the encounter of relig­
ion proper with these secularisms not necessarily as an existential problem, 
but rather as a historic-cultural phenomenon. However, when we take these 
forms of secularism as anti-religious forces (as they are in reality) the en­
counter of religions proper with them becomes, for us religious persons, an 
existential problem, a problem upon which one stakes the stand or fall of 
one’s faith. In the former case, the necessary significance of the present en­
counter between religions, i.e., the encounter in the face of the attack of anti- 
religious forces, is not understood internally enough. Only in the latter 
case, i.e., through the- awareness of the religions proper being attacked by 
the contemporary anti-religious forces, can the total experience of the holy 
as such be opened up and thereby the raison d’etre of religion be de­
monstrated beyond anti-religious principles. The present situation demands, 
in my view, that the dialogue between religions proper be carried out with 
unceasing reference to the anti-religious forces and their religion-negating 
principles. Thus, we today can not and should not be observing participants 
but deeply existential self-risking participants.
The Kingdom of God and Nirvana.
In his approach to a dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism, 
Tillich is much fairer and more perceptive than any other Christian theo­
logian, past or present. He clearly denies that Christianity is the absolute 
religion, and duly considers Buddhism as a living religion which stands in 
polar tension to Christianity. The method which he adopts in this regard 
is a dynamic typology. In the method of dynamic typology the places of 
both Christianity and Buddhism are determined, as the contrasting poles 
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within the whole of man’s religious existence or man’s experience of the 
holy. The polar element of Christianity is, in Tillich’s view, the social-ethical 
element or the experience of the holy as it ought to be, while the polar 
element of Buddhism is the mystical element or the experience of the holy 
as being, (p. 58) From this position, Tillich develops a dialogue between 
Christianity and Buddhism by contrasting the Kingdom of God and 
Nirvana in terms of their telos or controlling symbols. He considers the 
ontological principles behind these symbols to be participation and identity, 
the ethical consequences deriving from these ontological principles to be 
agape and compassion and, finally, their resultant attitudes toward history 
to be on the one hand revolutionary and, on the other, detached. His ap­
proach is penetrating and quite provocative. However, his characterization 
of Nirvana in terms of identity, compassion, and detachment as Buddhist 
principles in contrast with the Christian equivalents is not entirely free 
from a Christian coloration.
As for the formulation of the telos of the two religions as the starting 
point of the discussion, Tillich uses the following telos-formulas: “in Christ­
ianity the telos of everyone and everything united in the Kingdom of God; 
in Buddhism the telos of everything and everyone fulfilled in the Nirvana.” 
(p. 64) The italics of “everyozze” which, in the telos-formula of Christianty, 
precedes “everything,” and “everything” which, in the telos-formula of 
Buddhism, precedes “everyone” seem to me to imply that in the Christian 
symbol of the Kingdom of God man is taken as superior to things in their 
unity, thus the symbol being personal; while in the Buddhist idea of the 
Nirvana the thing holds priority to man in their fulfillment, thereby the 
symbol being transpersonal. This supposed implication seems to be sup­
ported by his discussion on participation versus identity, agape versus 
compassion and so forth. If I am not wrong in this respect, I should say 
that Tillich misses the important aspect of the dialectical character of 
Nirvana.
It is true that, as seen in such well known phrases of Buddhist Scrip­
tures as, “ All sentient beings altogether have the Buddha-nature ” or “ All 
the trees, herbs and lands attain Buddhahood,” Buddhism often emphasizes 
the fulfillment of things without mentioning man. Again, it is true in a sense 
that Buddhism does not give a special or superior position to man over 
against other living and non-living things with regard to his nature and 
salvation; while Christianity, as the Genesis story shows, assigns man the 
task of ruling over all other creatures and ascribes to him alone the imago 
dei through which he, unlike other creatures, can directly respond to the 
Words of God. But how is the fulfillment of things understood to take 
113
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
place in Buddhism? Does it take place as a sheer objective happenning 
which precedes, or occurs apart from, man’s realization? No. The fulfill­
ment of things may take place only when, and at the same moment, the 
fulfillment of a man who is related with them takes place. Without the 
fulfillment of man and his realization of it the fulfillment of things is simply 
out of the question. Therefore, the Nirvana in which everything and 
everyone are fulfilled is not a state objectively observable—Tillich calls 
Nirvana “the state of transtemporal blessedness” (p. 68)—■ but is Enlighten­
ment as such or the subjective Realization in which everything and every­
one are respectively realized as they are. In other words, Nirvana is 
nothing but man’s Realization of his ex-istential True Self as the ultimate 
ground both of his ordinary self and the world opposed to it. Accordingly, 
Nirvana obtains only through a man’s realization, the Realization of No­
ego. In this sense, Buddhism, too, ascribes to man a prominence over other 
beings. Accordingly, Nirvana is not simply transpersonal but also, at once, 
personal. Then, why does the Buddhist emphasize the fulfillment of every- 
thingl
In Buddhism, samsara, life-death transmigration, as the fundamental 
problem of man, is understood to be fully eliminated only when it is taken 
as a problem of more universal nature than that of man’s life and death, 
i.e., when it is taken as the problem of generation and extinction which is 
common to all living beings, or, more basically, as the problem of being- 
nonbeing, that is, the problem of transiency which is common to all beings, 
living or non-living. This means that in Buddhism man’s life-death 
problem, though fundamental to man, is wrestled with and eliminated, not 
only as the life-death problem on the human dimension, but also as the 
generation-extinction problem or, in the last analysis, as the being-nonbeing 
problem on the dimension of ontological nature. Unless the transciency as 
such which is common to all beings is overcome at the root of man’s 
existence, his problem of life and death cannot be properly solved. This is 
the reason Buddhism emphasizes the fulfillment of everything in Nirvana. 
Howerer, the being-nonbeing problem, the problem of transciency, though 
common to all beings, including man, is realized as such and sought to be 
eliminated only by man, who has a self-consciousness. Thus, Buddhism 
emphasizes the necessity of practice and enlightenment while one, who 
may transmigrate through other forms of life, exists as a man.
In short, Buddhist Nirvana is the Realization of man’s transpersonal 
True Self in which, and in which alone, everything and everyone, including 
himself, are respectively and equally fulfilled as such in their particularity. 
This involves the following two points: first, in Nirvana everything and 
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everyone are equal and return, through man’s Realization, to the Oneness 
as the ontological ground beyond their differentiation ; second, in Nirvana 
everything and everyone are respectively and distinctively fulfilled, being 
more clearly distinguished from each other than elsewhere. This dialectical 
character of Nirvana is possible because Nirvana is not an objectively 
observable state but is man’s Realization of the Ultimate Ground of both 
subject and object, of both the self and the world. Mahayana Buddhism 
severely criticizes a oneness of everything without discrimination as a false 
equality or a false sameness. Sheer equality as the negation of differentiation 
can not, of course, be called true equality. Again, equality in oneness as 
the ultimate ground, e.g., to hen, God, esse ipsum, or whatever it may be 
named, if it is substantial, can never be real equality, because even equality 
in this sense is still involved with, and thereby is limited by, a differenti­
ation, the differentiation between the substantial oneness and things which 
are taken as equal in it. Only in Oneness which is non-substantial and in 
which, thereby, everything is thoroughly fulfilled without eliminating its 
differentiation can real equality take place. This real and dynamic equality 
is, in Buddhism, usually expressed as “Differentiation as it is is equality; 
equality as it is is differentiation.” This is nothing but the living structure 
of Nirvana as the Realization of Oneness which is non-substantial, which 
is the negation of substantial oneness as the negation of differentiation. 
This dialectical structure of equality can obtain existentially in terms of 
Nirvana because Nirvana is not a state but is Realization, Realization to, 
and Realization of, non-substantial Oneness.
This leads us to another emphasis of Mahayana Buddhism concerning 
Nirvana. Throughout its long history, Mahayana Buddhism has always em­
phasized “Do not abide in Nirvana” as well as “Do not abide in samsara.” 
If one abides in so-called Nirvana by transcending samsara, it must be said 
that one is not yet free from attachment, attachment to Nirvana, being con­
fined by the discrimination between Nirvana and samsara, and that one is 
still selfishly concerned with his own salvation, forgetting the suffering of 
others in samsara. On the basis of the idea of Bodhisattva, Mahayana 
Buddhism thus criticizes and rejects Nirvana as the transcendence of samsara 
and teaches the true Nirvana to be the returning to samsara by negating 
or transcending “Nirvana as the transcendence of samsara.” Therefore, 
Nirvana in the Mahayana sense, while transcending samara, is nothing but 
the realization of samsara really as samsara, no more, no less, through the 
complete returning to samsara itself. This is why, in Mahayana Buddhism, 
it is often said of the true Nirvana that, “Samsara-as-it-is is Nirvana.” This 
paradoxical statement is again based on the dialectical character of the 
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true Nirvana which is, logically speaking, the negation of negation (that 
is, absolute affirmation) or the transcendence of transcendence (that is, 
absolute immanence). True Nirvana is, according to Mahayana Buddhism, 
the real source of both prajila (Wisdom) and karuna (Mercy), because it 
is entirely free from discrimination, thereby making the differentiation of 
everything clear, and because it is unselfishly concerned with the salvation 
of all others in samsara through one’s own returning to samsara.
I am afraid that I have spent too much time in expounding the Bud­
dhist idea of Nirvana. It is, however, basically necessary to clarify the the 
meaning of Nirvana in order to review Tillich’s “Christian-Buddhist Con­
versation ” and to promote, in the right direction, a dialogue between the 
two religions. In Mahayana Buddhism, criticism against the oneness of 
of everything beyond differentiation as a false equality and the rejection of 
Nirvana as the transcendence of samsara are key points by which Mahayana 
Buddhism distinguishes itself from Theravada Buddhism. These points 
have, however, often been overlooked by western scholars. In the light of 
the meaning of Nirvana as briefly elucidated above, the reader may come 
to see that Tillich’s discussions on Nirvana, identity, compassion, and de­
tachment in Buddhism do not necessarily represent their real meanings, and 
thus do not strike the right chord of “ a Christian-Buddhist conversation,” 
although his undertaking of a “conversation” should be highly appreciated.
Personal and transpersonal, participation and identity.
Because of the limitation of space, I must confine myself to taking up 
only the following several points of his “Christian-Buddhist Conversation.”
(1) Refering to Kingdom of God and Nirvana, Tillich says, “ The Ultimate 
in Christianity is symbolized in personal categories, the Ultimate in Bud­
dhism in transpersonal categories, for example, ‘absolute non-being’.” (p. 
65f.) This is a view based on the Christiancategory of the ‘personal’ or 
‘personality.’ Nirvana or absolute non-being as the Ultimate in Buddhism 
is certainly not personal but transpersonal. Howerer, it is transpersonal 
not in the sense of “ non-personal” as the counter concept of “personal” 
but in the sense that, being beyond the distinction between man and nature, 
the personal and the non-personal, it is able to let both the personal and the 
non-personal fulfill their respective natures. Even the esse ipsum, being 
itself, of the classical Christian doctrine of God, though transpersonal, 
is not so in the same sense as the Buddhist Nirvana. God as being itself 
is beyond the contrast of essential and existential being, of finitude and in­
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finity,1 and, in a sense, of being and non-being. God as being itself, how­
ever, unlike Nirvana as absolute Mu (the English equivalents, non-being or 
nothingness, do not sufficiently convey the original meaning whose logical 
structure is “absolute negation, i.e., the negation of negation, is absolute 
affirmation ”) does not thoroughly transcend the contrast of being to the ex­
tent that by its transcendence both being and non-being are totally made to 
work through total acceptance. It does not really reach the dialectical 
point of the double characteristic described as creative and abysmal,2 in 
the relation of all beings to the problem of being and non-being. Esse 
ipsum. as the transpersonal is not the transpersonal which makes nature 
(the non-personal) as well as man (the personal) equally fulfill their re­
spective natures through the realization of absolute Mu.
1 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I. (Chicago, Illinois: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 236, 237.
2 Ibid., p. 237.
3 Ibid., p. 176.
In this connection, finally, let me raise a question. When the Ultimate, 
being beyond the contrast of essential and existential being, of finitude and 
infinity, and of being and non-being, is understood not as the Absolute Mu 
(Nothingness) but esse ipsum or being itself, is not the Ultimate still some­
what objectified? Is not the Ultimate founded on an unconsciously posited, 
hidden, last presupposition ? If so, is it not that the Ultimate in that sense 
is not the true Ultimate?
(2) As the ontological principles lying behind the symbols of the King­
dom of God and Nirvana, Tillich takes up “participation” and “identity.” 
He says, “One participates, as an individual being, in the Kingdom of God. 
One is identical with everything that is in Nirvana.” (p. 68) For Tillich 
individualization and participation are interdependent in a polar tension. 
“No individual exists without participation, and no personal being exists 
without communal being.”3 In the Kingdom of God both individualization 
and participation reach their ultimate form in the polarity. This is the basis 
of Biblical personalism and Christian ethics.
However, is not the real polar element of individualization not partici­
pation but identity? Participation, however dialectical its character may 
be, can not be essentially relieved of its “partial” or “relative” nature. It is 
indeed true that without an encounter with and participation in another 
individual, no individual exists and realizes itself as an individual. Indivi­
dualization through participation, however, can not be complete indivi­
dualization because of the “partial” or “relative” nature of participation, 
although such a fundamentally relational character of the person as com­
117
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
munion can well be established by individualization through participation. 
In Christianity, according to Tillich, “God is the principle of participation 
as well as the principle of individualization.”1 Participation as the polar 
principle of individualization is necessary in Christianity because God is 
substantial “being-itself,” and not non-substantial “absolute Mu” (non-being 
or nothingness). However, cannot the principle of individualization be com­
pletely and thoroughly fulfilled not through the principle of participation as 
“being-itself” but through the principle of identity as “absolute Mu”—■ 
Nirvana ? Identity as an ontological principle of absolute Mu is neither 
identity as the sheer negation of individuality nor identity in oneness as the 
ultimate, substantial, ground such as God, esse ipsum, substantia (Spinoza) 
or Indifference (Schelling)—just as equality in Nirvana is neither equality 
as the mere negation of differentiation nor equality in oneness as the ulti­
mate, substantial, ground. Identity as an ontological principle of Nirvana 
is, accordingly, not identity with oneness which is substantial, but, identity 
with absolute Nothingness. Thus, identity in this sense, unlike identity with 
substantial oneness in which, because of the elimination of differentiation, 
individualization cannot completely be fulfilled, involves in itself total dif­
ferentiation, and this through individualization. This may be well under­
stood if the reader recalls that Nirvana is, as discussed before, not an objec­
tively observable state but one’s Realization in which everything and every­
one, including oneself, are respectively and equally realized as they are. In 
Nirvana identity itself is individualization.
1 Ibid., p. 245.
From this viewpoint, the Christian answer given to a Buddhist priest, 
“Only if each person has a substance of his own is community possible, for 
community presupposes separation. You, Buddhist friends, have identity, 
but not community” (p. 75) compels me to raise the following questions: 
Are not both community and separation in Christian understanding incom­
plete in so far as the self as well as God are understood as substantial? Is 
not the dialectical nature of the Christian understanding of community and 
separation really not dialectical, thus not reaching the core of ultimate 
reality? Buddhist communion takes place as the communion of the “Realizer 
of Nirvana” with everything and everyone in the topos of the absolute Mu 
in which everything and everyone are respectively absolute, being just as 
they are, and thus absolutely relative.
(3) Let me, in this connection, refer to the Buddhist rock garden which 
Tillich speaks of as “a quite conspicuous expression of the principle of 
identity” but, unfortunately, with some misunderstanding. He describes a 
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statement he heard concerning the rockgarden as follows: “These expres­
sively arranged rocks are both here and, at the same time, everywhere in 
the universe in a kind of mystical omnipresence, and their particular ex­
istence here and now is not significant.” (p. 70) Buddhists more correctly 
would say that “these expressively arranged rocks are both here and, at the 
same time, everywhere in the universe” not in a kind of mystical omni­
presence but in Sunyata (Emptiness) which is another expression of Nirvana. 
The empty garden covered by white sand expresses Sunyata, identity with 
absolute Mu. True Sunyata, however, just like true Nirvana, is by no means 
sheer emptiness, i.e., emptiness as the privation or negation of things which 
are. True Sunyata, being the negation of sheer emptiness as well as sheer 
fullness, is an active and creative Emptiness which, just because of being 
itself empty, lets everything and everyone be and work respectively in their 
particularity. It may be helpful here to mention that Sunyata, just like 
Nirvana, is not a state but is Realization. The several rocks with different 
shapes and characters which are placed here and there on the white sand 
are nothing but the self-expression of the true Sunyata which lets everything 
stand and work. Each rock is not simply something with a particular form 
but, equally and respectively, the self-expression, through the taking form, 
of the true Sunyata, that is, the True Self which is beyond every form. It 
can properly be said that “these expressively arranged rocks are both here 
and, at the same time, everywhere in the universe” because they are just 
here and now in the empty garden both as they are and, at the same time, 
as the self-expression of true Sunyata which is beyond time and space. If 
“their particular existence here and now is not significant,” the white sand 
garden would express a dead emptiness, which Mahayana Buddhism, es­
pecially Zen, severely rejects as a false equality or an annihilatory nothing­
ness. The very existence of these rocks in the empty garden, equally and 
respectively, shows the real profoundness, the creative profoundness of True 
Self which embraces, as the Realization of the absolute Mu, everything and 
everyone in their identity and individualization.
In short, the Buddhist rock garden is not a product of nature mysticism, 
to say nothing of theistic mysticism, but the product of the creative expres­
sion of the realization of Sunyata as one’s True Self. A visitor may be 
strongly impressed by it because he, in looking at it, is drawn into that 
Sunyata which is expressed in, and as, a rock garden, which Sunyata, even 
though not yet consciously realized by the visitor, is nevertheless the root­
source of his existence, i. e., his True Self.
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Agape and compassion, and others.
(4) In his “Christian-Buddhist Conversation,” Tillich, along the basic 
line of his understanding as mentioned before, further discusses the matter 
of agape and compassion, one as the Christian the other as the Buddhist 
ethical principle of man’s relation to man and to society, and the matter of 
the revolutionary nature of Christianity and the detached character of 
Buddhism in their attitudes toward history. It may be, I now hope, under­
stood without a detailed discussion that his understanding of Buddhist 
compassion and the Buddhist “detached” attitude toward history does not 
quite hit the mark. In this regard, let me raise several questions with short 
comments.
Is the will to transform the individual as well as the social structure 
absolutely necessary in a religion’s attitude to man, to society and to history ? 
Is the prophetic quest for justice an indispensable element in religious ac­
tivity as regards the human situation? Is the only justifiable way for a re­
ligion to react to the human, social and historic reality, necessarily to be 
based on the will to transform with a revolutionary force? Does not, and 
did not, the very will to transform or the very prophetic quest for justice, 
even though being based on agape, cause, after all, against its original 
intention, a new and incessant struggle in human history and fall itself into 
a “false endlessness” (in Japanese, aku miigen: in German, schlechte Un- 
endlichkeit)? Is there not an optical illusion in Christian eschatology?1 
Does not the Christian will to transform, however much it may spring from 
agape, in the last analysis approach and try to transform the other one or 
the social and historic structure, not from within but somewhat from with­
out, in so far as agape is, in its nature, the movement from the higher to 
the lower? And thereby does it not produce inevitably a new conflict as 
well as an improvement?
1 See Keiji Nishitani, Shiikyo to wa Nanika (“What is Religion ?”) (Tokyo : 
Sobunsha, 1961), pp. 234, 247, 255.
“Compassion is,” Tillich says, “a state in which he who does not suffer 
under his own conditions may suffer by identification with another who 
suffers. He neither accepts the other one in terms of ‘in spite of,’ nor does 
he try to transform him, but he suffers his suffering through identification.” 
(p. 71) In contrast with this understanding, in Buddhist compassion or 
mahakaruna (Great Mercy), he who, (to the extent that he becomes identical 
with the absolute Mu through the death of his ego), “does not suffer” just 
because of his own profound suffering, suffers with another who suffers 
through the fundamental identification not simply with the other but with 
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the absolute Mu or Nirvana which the other must also, in his original 
nature, return to and. realize. He does not, in any sense, accept the other 
in so far as the other, in his egoistic attachment, does not yet return to 
and realize the absolute Mu. At the same time, however, on the basis of 
the realization of the absolute Mu as the principle of “differentiation as it is 
is equality” he totally accepts the other just because the other, in his egoistic 
attachment, does not yet return to and realize the absolute Mu. In Buddhist 
compassion one accepts the other not “in spite of” but “just because of” his 
selfishness, completely deepening and transcending the in-spite-of position 
through one’s realization of the absolute Mu in which everyone, including 
oneself, as well as everything are equally and respectively made to work 
from the very ground of their existence.
It may well be said that the in-spite-of character of the Christian faith 
by means of prophetic criticism and the “will to transform” based upon 
divine justice, functions as a militant element (as expressed in the terms of 
“church militant” and “church triumphant”) in the realm of human society 
and history, whereas the just-because-of nature of Buddhist realization, by 
dissolving and regenerating personal and collective karma, functions as a 
stabilizing element running beneath all social and historical levels. The 
in-spite-of character of the Christian faith is apt, I am afraid, to increase as 
well as decrease tension among people, to cause a new dissension as well as 
a great unity, thus falling into a false endlessness (schlechte Unendlichkeit). 
On the other hand, there is always the risk, in the just-because-of nature of 
Buddhist realization which accepts everything indiscriminately, even social 
and historic evil, that one’s attitude towards the world will be, because of 
a false sameness, indifferent.
As Tillich points out, it is notable that “prophetic” religions such as 
Judaism, Christianity, and especially Islam, for the most part resisted and 
are resisting the invasion of Communism in the West while such Eastern 
“mystical” religions as Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism allow the inva­
sion of Communism in a great part of the Orient without displaying sufficient 
resistance to it. The encounter of religion with Communism is unquestion­
ably an important problem of today. The Communist infiltration of China 
and other parts of the East is no doubt partly the fault of the distorted form 
of Oriental religions, especially Buddhism with its just-because-of nature.
As a more fundamental religious question, however, I believe it must 
be asked if the only legitimate way for a religion to react to secularism is 
for it to directly resist attacks and challenges on the same level that secular­
ism works. Simply because they lack the form of resistance taken by Chris­
tianity should Buddhism and other Eastern religions be immediately judged 
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as totally powerless to transform the sociological and psychological structure 
of man in any way? What, after all, should religion’s attitude be toward 
secularism as such? This question leads us to a final point in the review of 
Tillich’s “Christian Buddhist Conversation,” that is, the understanding of 
the nature of the “Holy” in these two religions. This problem is also closely 
connected with the last chapter of the book now under review, “ Christianity 
Judging Itself in the Light of Its Encounter with the World Religions,” 
especially its essential point: Christian criteria of judging Christianity and 
religion in general. Space, however, does not allow me to go into that at 
this time, and the present review article must end here.
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